On July 26, General Abdulrahmane Chiani detained Niger’s democratically elected president, Mohamed Bazoum, and appointed himself chairman of the military junta, the so-called National Council for the Defense of the Homeland. Less than a week later, on July 30, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) issued an ultimatum to the junta: return the former president to power within a week or face additional sanctions and the threat of military force. There have been a number of coups in the region in recent years, and ECOWAS is understandably concerned about the spread of coups.
That ultimatum then expired and Ciani remained resolute, precipitating the ECOWAS crisis. On August 10, member states Nigeria, Senegal, Benin, and Ivory Coast all pledged to provide troops to restore democracy to Niger, and the bloc put its military on alert. Meanwhile, Burkina Faso and Mali – both run by military regimes – have sent “solidarity” missions to Niger, pushing the region to the brink of war.
On July 26, General Abdulrahmane Chiani detained Niger’s democratically elected president, Mohamed Bazoum, and appointed himself chairman of the military junta, the so-called National Council for the Defense of the Homeland. Less than a week later, on July 30, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) issued an ultimatum to the junta: return the former president to power within a week or face additional sanctions and the threat of military force. There have been a number of coups in the region in recent years, and ECOWAS is understandably concerned about the spread of coups.
That ultimatum then expired and Ciani remained resolute, precipitating the ECOWAS crisis. On August 10, member states Nigeria, Senegal, Benin, and Ivory Coast all pledged to provide troops to restore democracy to Niger, and the bloc put its military on alert. Meanwhile, Burkina Faso and Mali – both run by military regimes – have sent “solidarity” missions to Niger, pushing the region to the brink of war.
Little is known about Ciani himself, and the junta remains tight-lipped, leading to intense speculation about the coup’s motives. Much has been written about Ciani’s role as head of the presidential guard tasked with protecting Bazoum and his alleged involvement in previous failed coup attempts. Rumors have been circulating that Mr. Bazoum was planning to remove Mr. Ciani, but little attention has been paid to his previous role as a UN peacekeeper.
Ciani’s military career included several regional multilateral missions, as well as United Nations missions in Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan. His career represents a new generation of military professionals with significant international military experience. Blue helmet-cum-coup plotters like Ciani can be contextualized by considering the historical evolution of peacekeeping.
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community and the United Nations have increased funding for militaries in non-democratic or weak democracies to meet growing demands for peacekeeping. And countries like Niger are eager to take over. In the five years leading up to the end of the Cold War, the United Nations authorized 20 new peacekeeping missions and the number of troops increased almost sevenfold, from 11,000 to 75,000. Their number now exceeds the 90,000 peacekeeping forces deployed around the world.
At the same time, wealthy democracies have withdrawn from peacekeeping operations, increasing their dependence on countries such as Niger. While earlier missions primarily involved surveillance along well-defined ceasefire lines, post-Cold War missions (also known as second-generation peacekeeping) were more demanding and typically bloodier. The military is now regularly tasked with securing ceasefires between warring parties in ongoing civil wars.
In 1990, the top contributors to peacekeeping forces were Canada, Finland, Austria, Norway, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, all liberal democracies. By 2015, they had been replaced by Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Nigeria, and Egypt, all of which are less democratic states with a history of regime instability.
While the effects of peacekeeping on countries that deploy peacekeepers are positive and well-established, the effects on countries that send troops, such as Niger, are hotly debated. Some analysts suggest that peacekeeping operations have a beneficial democratizing effect among sending states, socializing them to human rights norms and encouraging them to abide by the rule of law. This is because “insubordination” (read coup) jeopardizes future missions and the lucrative incentives attached to peacekeepers, who are generously compensated for their missions. The United Nations spends more than $6 billion a year on peacekeeping, much of it on troop reimbursement and material costs. Pay for peacekeeping missions, especially in less developed countries, can account for a significant portion of the military budget of the sending country and the take-home pay of the individual soldier. In fact, it is argued that some countries today engage in peacekeeping for profit.
But some warn that peacekeeping has a more compounding effect, potentially entrenching authoritarian rule and contributing to coup tendencies in fragile democracies like Niger.
Peacekeeping operations may socialize sending states into international values associated with the United Nations, but all too often human rights violations are tolerated and illiberal norms are reinforced.
And in reality, the international community has become overly dependent on these countries for peacekeeping and therefore reluctant to sanction them, even when their actions deviate significantly from liberal norms. In fact, some countries use peacekeeping operations to build stronger militaries. The result is often increased military authority in countries with a history of coups and an imbalance with civilian authorities.
Niger has experienced rapid growth in its peacekeeping role, currently contributing approximately 1,000 military and security personnel (up from eight per year in 2000). Meanwhile, the international community has sent approximately $500 million to Niger over the past decade from the United States alone, in addition to training and assistance, to improve security and strengthen Niger’s military. And the United Nations praises Niger and thanks it for its contribution to peacekeeping.
However, the international community has also become reluctant to criticize peacekeepers like those in Niger, often remaining silent in the face of serious human rights violations and democratic backsliding. And peacekeepers are given permission to ignore conditions such as the practice of linking aid to democracy.
This negative attitude became evident in the aftermath of the coup. A spokesman for UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed “deep concern” over events in Niger, but the organization did not impose sanctions or cut aid in response to the coup. And although ECOWAS has cut electricity to the country, it has refused to take stronger action and allowed the ultimatum to expire without consequences.
Although the likely causes of coups are overdetermined, states that send peacekeepers with better training and experience abroad are more likely to experience coups, and peacekeepers like Ciani are often responsible themselves. The idea that liberal norms somehow pervade peacekeeping operations is a myth, given the history of peacekeeping forces with domestic predatory behavior. Evidence from Niger suggests that peacekeeping may have played a role in recent events, providing the military regime with greater means to intervene in the country’s political affairs, including a more energetic and courageous military.
Evidence suggests that peacekeeping is a condition for accepting military intervention in politics, which increases the risk of a coup, but cannot be certain that it causes a coup. That poses a challenge for policymakers.
The United Nations may consider measures to prevent the leakage of funds and supplies intended solely for peacekeeping purposes. This could be achieved through stricter monitoring and monitoring or the imposition of sanctions against peacekeepers who violate organizational norms.
Given the history of recent coups, one might question the wisdom of building the capacity of peacekeeping states. Rather, the UN should act to cut off the forces involved in the coup, as it has threatened (but failed) in the past. Wealthy democracies, on the other hand, may supplement peacekeeping gaps and support by contributing more troops themselves, rather than giving money to other countries.
