From resource extraction to energy conversion
China’s role in Africa’s energy sector has undergone quiet but significant changes over the past two decades. In the early 2000s, China’s financing and construction activity on the continent was overwhelmingly focused on fossil fuels, large hydroelectric dams, and transportation infrastructure to transport goods. Coal-fired power plants, oil pipelines, and mining-related infrastructure dominated the initial project portfolio, reflecting both Africa’s impending power shortages and China’s own development trajectory at the time.
This approach began to change in the early 2010s with a concerted effort. Africa’s electricity demand was growing faster than grid expansion, climate finance was becoming central to development discussions, and China itself was emerging as the world’s largest producer of renewable energy technologies. By 2013, when President Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), renewable energy had already become a strategic export area for Chinese companies. Africa, with its vast solar, wind, hydro and geothermal power potential, is increasingly becoming part of that equation.
The turning point occurred after 2015, when three developments coincided. First, the Paris Climate Agreement reshaped global energy investment. Second, African governments have begun to prioritize energy diversification and climate resilience in their national development plans. Third, China’s policy banks and state-owned enterprises faced increasing pressure to reduce their exposure to overseas coal projects. Together, these forces laid the foundation for a new phase of China-Africa engagement, one focused on energy transition rather than extraction.
Breakdown of China’s financing models for renewable energy projects in Africa (2010-2025). The data reflects an estimated $66 billion in investment through policy bank loans, EPC contracts, and equipment exports. Source: UNCTAD, China Development Bank, African Development Bank
FOCAC and the policy structure behind China’s green promotion
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has become the main institutional platform shaping this change. Since its inception in 2000, FOCAC has evolved from a trade assistance forum to a vehicle for strategic economic partnership. Renewable energy gradually but decisively entered the agenda.
At the 2015 Johannesburg FOCAC Summit, China formally committed to supporting clean energy development in Africa under the “10 Cooperation Plans”. This marks the first time that renewable energy has been featured as an independent pillar of cooperation rather than a subset of infrastructure. By the 2018 Beijing FOCAC Summit, clean energy was further on the agenda, with pledges for solar, wind and hydro projects alongside capacity building and technology transfer.
The most important change occurred at the 2021 Dakar FOCAC Ministerial Conference, where President Xi announced that China would halt the construction of new coal-fired power plants overseas. Although not unique to Africa, its impact on the continent was immediate. The financing and construction pipeline focused on renewable energy, particularly utility-scale solar PV, wind farms, and grid-connected hydropower rehabilitation projects.
FOCAC 2024 further strengthens this direction and incorporates green development into the China-Africa cooperation framework through green finance, local manufacturing of renewable components, and skills transfer initiatives. China’s renewable energy investments increasingly reflect its long-term strategic position in Africa’s energy transition, rather than individual projects.
China’s renewable energy investments in Africa, 2010-2025. Left: Total investment by country (billions of USD). Ethiopia, South Africa and Kenya are highlighted as top investment destinations. Right: Sectoral allocation showing the share of hydro, solar, wind and geothermal. Data sources: UNCTAD, African Development Bank, China Development Bank
Costs, capacity and real-world projects: Building renewable energy in Africa
To assess China’s role in Africa’s green transition, it is essential to examine not only trends but also actual projects, their costs, capabilities, partners, and schedules.
Kenya – Garissa Solar Power Plant (2018–2019)
One of the most cited examples of China’s involvement in renewable energy is the Garissa solar power plant in Kenya. The 54.6MW facility, built by China Jiangxi International and supported by a US$135.7 million loan from the Export-Import Bank of China, was connected to the national grid in late 2018 and began operations in 2019. It currently contributes approximately 2% to Kenya’s national energy mix, powers approximately 70,000 households, and reduces an estimated 43,000 tons of CO₂. Annual emissions.
The project’s cost per installed megawatt (approximately US$2.5 million per megawatt) reflects both the high initial capital expenditures of solar PV deployments in Africa and the concessional financing models that Chinese policy banks tend to utilize. Beyond the power plant itself, the project has allowed Kenya to diversify its energy portfolio and reduce its dependence on expensive fossil fuels.
Ethiopia – Adama Wind Farm (2012–2015)
In Ethiopia, Chinese financing is supporting the expansion of wind power through the Adama Wind Farm, which consists of two phases primarily financed by the Export-Import Bank of China. The project, valued at approximately USD 460 million, will provide 204 MW of capacity, with Adama I having 51 MW (commissioned in 2012) and Adama II having 153 MW (commissioned in 2015).
This investment significantly contributed to the diversification of Ethiopia’s energy mix, which has historically relied heavily on hydropower. Recent national data shows that renewable energy, including wind and hydropower, accounts for nearly 90% of Ethiopia’s installed capacity, with significant changes in investment over the past decade.
South Africa – Wind and Solar Power Supply Chain (2017-2024)
South Africa’s renewable energy expansion shows a different pattern. Here, Chinese companies are focusing on equipment supply and joint ventures rather than unilateral project financing. Chinese manufacturers such as Trina Solar, BYD, and JA Solar supply panels, inverters, and battery systems for utility-scale solar and wind farms. Chinese companies were involved in 11 out of 13 renewable energy projects completed between 2010 and 2024, according to an industry report.
One notable example is the De Aar wind farm (244.5 MW), which was commissioned in 2017 under a joint venture involving Longyuan Power (China). This reflects how Chinese technology will play a key role even as multilateral and local financing drives investment.
Botswana – Jwaneng Solar Power Plant (2025)
In southern Africa, the Jwaneng solar farm in Botswana is an example of an emerging Chinese-backed solar investment. The 100MW project, with construction to begin in 2024, is expected to cost approximately US$78.3 million and is being financed and operated through a consortium that includes Chinese partners and local power companies.
Broader financial patterns and export trends
China’s influence in renewable energy in Africa extends beyond financing individual projects. Trade and manufacturing data shows that Chinese renewable technologies are penetrating African markets.
In May 2025, Africa’s solar panel imports from China reached 1.57 million kW in a single month, a record high, with at least 22 African countries doubling their imports year-on-year, according to Chinese customs data analyzed by independent energy analysts. This surge in imports reflects trends in both utility size and off-grid adoption. A British think tank estimates China’s involvement in the energy sector, including renewables, in Africa at around US$66 billion between 2010 and 2024, a significant portion of which has supported solar and wind deployment since 2018.
Despite this, Africa still accounts for a disproportionately low share of global clean energy investment, at only about 3% per year, far short of the US$200 billion per year estimated to be needed to meet continent-wide energy access and climate goals.
Strategic and development implications
Affordable power and emissions reduction
Chinese investment is helping to reduce the cost of introducing renewable energy in Africa. Projects like Garissa and Adama will provide clean electricity at scale, reducing dependence on expensive diesel generators and imported fossil fuels. This has a direct impact on the economic competitiveness and climate resilience of countries where grid reliability was once a major constraint.
Energy planners in Kenya and Ethiopia are now incorporating renewable energy into national energy strategies aimed at lowering costs, stabilizing supply and reducing carbon emissions for households and industry. These changes are also in line with the African Union’s broader goals to increase renewable energy capacity from less than 60 GW in 2022 to more than 300 GW by 2030, a transformational scale-up for the continent.
Industry dependencies and local value chains
Despite positive growth, China’s dominance in equipment supply also exposes Africa to dependency risks. Most solar panels, turbines and energy storage systems continue to be imported from China, with limited local manufacturing capacity developed in Africa itself. The record surge in imports, including 1.57 MW of Chinese-made panels in May 2025, highlights both demand and dependence.
The move has sparked debate among African policymakers about the balance between immediate cost-effective deployment and long-term development of local industry. Some governments are exploring policies to encourage local assembly and manufacturing, but progress remains uneven.
Debt and fiscal challenges
Renewable projects tend to have lower operating costs, but the upfront capital required is still high. Policy bank loans from the Export-Import Bank of China and the State Development Bank of China helped fill the financing gap, but also contribute to the host country’s long-term external debt. Balancing development finance and fiscal sustainability remains an ongoing challenge for many African countries.
Conclusion: A subtle legacy
China’s involvement in renewable energy in Africa is far from a simple tale of philanthropy and extractive diplomacy being green. This is a complex partnership shaped by political commitment (through FOCAC), industrial capacity, strategic export interests, and Africa’s demand for affordable and reliable electricity. Projects like the Garissa solar farm in Kenya (US$135.7 million) and the Adama wind farm in Ethiopia (US$460 million) are just visible indicators of broader power relations.
China’s renewable energy footprint has helped Africa expand its clean energy capacity, reduce emissions, and lower electricity costs. But it also raises important questions about local industrialization, long-term debt exposure, the depth of technology transfer, and more. As Africa pursues ambitious clean energy goals, understanding the full costs, impacts, and implications of Chinese investment will be essential for informed policy choices and equitable development outcomes.
