Approximately one-third of the world’s seaborne trade in fertilizers passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and recent disruptions to shipping due to the ongoing Gulf War have had a significant impact on sub-Saharan Africa. The region imports about 90% of its fertilizer from the Gulf, along with Russia and China. According to Reuters, the latter has already moved to release fertilizer reserves earlier than usual to stabilize supplies, but the recent crisis has exposed structural weaknesses in Africa’s agricultural markets: an overreliance on imports. The question now is whether Africa can rely more decisively on regional producers to cushion the shock, and what this war will ultimately reveal about the continent’s relationship between natural gas and food security.
East Africa’s exposure now comes into view
As a region with high imports, East Africa is particularly at risk. Bilal Bassiouni, Head of Risk Forecasting at Pangea-Risk, explained in an interview with Energy Capital & Power that the region is linked to sea routes linking Gulf producers to African ports.
“Ethiopia and Kenya rely on large-scale, state-led fertilizer procurement programs delivered through maritime logistics. Increased transportation risks and higher freight rates in the Strait of Hormuz mean these markets will face higher procurement costs and delivery delays ahead of the planting season,” he said.
Kenya already provides fertilizer subsidies through a program aimed at 3.15 million farmers. This reduced the price per bag by 62%. According to the country’s 2026 budget policy statement, the government planned to maintain and deepen the fertilizer subsidy program in the 2026/2027 financial year to consolidate the gains already achieved. The Gulf War could introduce complications to this plan.
Ethiopia faces similar vulnerabilities, importing 10.6 million quintals for the 2025/2026 season. With more than 95% of the country’s trade passing through the Djibouti Corridor, maritime disruptions can quickly become a domestic logistics problem when cargo slows down, has to be rerouted or becomes more expensive to land.
“The current crisis reinforces an already well-established debate: Africa’s food systems and industrial sectors remain disproportionately exposed to imported fertilizers, imported petrochemical intermediates, and a small number of maritime chokepoints,” Bassiouni said.
Africa has some replacement capacity, but not enough.
Africa has additional production capacity, but Bassiouni says there are limits in the short term. He stressed that the shock could support an acceleration of the move towards domestic production of fertilizers, regional value chains and intra-African trade.
“Morocco and Egypt dominate Africa’s fertilizer exports and could absorb some of the additional demand, particularly for phosphate products. Nigeria’s gas-based nitrogen production and Zambia’s regional fertilizer production capacity may also offer limited relief. However, these producing countries cannot immediately fully replace Gulf supplies as nitrogen fertilizers and petrochemical intermediates rely on large-scale gas processing capacity and established export logistics,” he said.
Several African countries have already expanded their fertilizer exports. Morocco plans to increase its annual production capacity of phosphate-based fertilizers from 15 million tonnes to 20 million tonnes by 2027. Nigeria’s Dangote Fertilizer Factory also brings a much larger nitrogen base to Africa, with an annual production capacity of 3 million tonnes of urea. While these efforts are laudable, they must be accompanied by an aggressive push toward large-scale natural gas production to enhance fertilizer production capacity. Sub-Saharan Africa has 70% (400 tcf) of the continent’s gas reserves, strengthening the case for gas-led investments.
Examples of regional supply chains
Strategic lessons are becoming harder to ignore. Africa not only needs access to fertilizer; We need more local production. There are early signs of this change. In August 2025, Ethiopia signed a contract with Nigeria’s Dangote Group to develop a $2.5 billion factory in the Somali region. Opaia Group is developing a $2 billion fertilizer factory in Angola, backed by $1.4 billion in debt financing from Afreximbank. Ghana is developing $5 billion in funding following a 2025 agreement with Qatar.
Bassiouni said the Gulf War “could accelerate that change as supply concentration risks become more visible to governments, buyers and lenders. However, the pace will still depend on gas supplies, electricity reliability, port and rail infrastructure, finance and long-term supply contracts.”
Fertilizer risks in Africa are thus not simply the result of a single conflict. It remains the product of a supply system that is overly dependent on imports. The current disruption may pass, but unless regional supply chains deepen substantially, the next geopolitical shock will produce the same results: higher costs, tighter supplies, and increased pressure on food security.
