China’s economic engagement in Africa is entering a more aggressive phase, defined by large-scale mining, infrastructure and energy investments that are increasingly integrated across value chains. From Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects to key mineral supply deals and gas monetization plans, Beijing is at the center of how African countries extract, transport and industrialize their resource base.
In the first half of 2025, China’s Belt and Road-related activities decisively shifted to resource-based sectors. Metals and metallurgy projects totaled about $24.9 billion, more than the sector’s full-year value for 2024, while oil and gas projects soared to a record high of about $44 billion. This momentum is largely driven by a large oil and gas processing facility construction contract in Nigeria worth an estimated $20 billion, highlighting Beijing’s growing focus on downstream energy infrastructure alongside critical minerals.
Chinese companies are expanding beyond full extraction to include downstream processing and infrastructure linkages. Zimbabwe, for example, is attracting Chinese investment in lithium processing facilities as Beijing strengthens its battery supply chain, while state-owned companies continue to deepen their operations in the rich copper belts of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia.
According to NJ Ayuk, executive chairman of the African Energy Chamber (AEC), this evolution reflects a deliberate shift in China’s Africa strategy. “China’s role on the continent is clearly moving beyond pure extraction to managing the entire value chain, from resource development to infrastructure and transportation,” Ayuk said. “This is most evident in copper and cobalt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Chinese companies have been incorporated not only as miners but also as processors and logistics operators.”
This value chain approach is becoming increasingly prominent in Africa’s gas and hydrocarbon sectors. In September 2025, the Republic of Congo signed a $23 billion integrated hydrocarbon agreement with China’s Wing Wah, covering the Bangakayo, Holmoni and Kayo land permits. The agreement aims to significantly expand Congo’s oil and gas production, with the goal of raising domestic crude oil production to 200,000 barrels per day by 2030 and unlocking more than 1.3 billion barrels of recoverable resources by 2050.
Importantly, the Wing Wah agreement extends beyond upstream development. This includes a comprehensive gas monetization and processing program featuring a phased expansion of LNG, LPG, butane and propane production, alongside gas processing facilities, on-site power generation and water management infrastructure. The structure reflects the Chinese government’s focus on monetizing previously stagnant gas while linking hydrocarbon development to domestic energy supplies and industrial use.
“For a project like Bangakayo, the real opportunity is not just in oil production, but in how gas is captured, processed and deployed,” Ayuk points out. “If governments define priorities early, such as power generation, petrochemicals and fertilizers, these developments can anchor the broader industrial ecosystem rather than remaining export-led.”
Infrastructure remains a central pillar of China’s engagement in Africa, increasingly linked to mining and energy investments rather than treated as a separate objective. The reconstruction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway with support from Chinese financial and construction companies underlines this approach by strengthening mineral export corridors while strengthening regional logistics connectivity.
Supporters of the China-Africa partnership argue that China remains an important partner for governments seeking to accelerate development. Chinese capital often materializes in areas where Western funding is scarce, especially for large infrastructure and processing projects with long payback periods. The bundled nature of China’s deals, which combine financing, construction, equipment, and operations expertise, also could reduce adjustment risks that often slow the deployment of private capital.
There are examples of collaborations that have broader impacts. The Simandou iron ore project in Guinea is expected to become one of the world’s largest high-grade iron ore operations, with Chinese stakeholders playing a leading role alongside international partners, and supported by new rail and port infrastructure with cross-sector economic benefits.
However, China’s expansion into the country is not without criticism. Concerns persist about debt sustainability, transparency and local value capture, particularly where contract terms are opaque or heavily biased towards the contractor. Civil society groups continue to raise environmental and labor issues related to mining development, but policymakers warn that over-reliance on a single external partner could weaken their negotiating leverage.
For Ayuk, the central issue is not China’s presence, but how African governments structure engagement. “African countries need to negotiate from a place of strategic clarity rather than urgency,” he says. “Local content, technology transfer and downstream participation need to be built in from the beginning, rather than added on later.”
As capital competition intensifies, it will be important to balance China’s role with other partners. “China will continue to be an essential partner for Africa,” Ayuk says, “but over-reliance limits options. The strongest results emerge when Chinese companies operate within a diverse framework that includes regional players, Western private capital, and multilateral institutions. It is that balance that transforms foreign investment into sustainable industrial development.”
